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ABSTRACT
Sign recognition is an integral part of autonomous cars. Any mis-
classification of traffic signs can potentially lead to a multitude of
disastrous consequences, ranging from a life-threatening accident
to even a large-scale interruption of transportation services rely-
ing on autonomous cars. In this paper, we propose and examine
security attacks against sign recognition systems for Deceiving
Autonomous caRs with Toxic Signs (we call the proposed attacks
DARTS). In particular, we introduce two novel methods to create
these toxic signs. First, we propose Out-of-Distribution attacks,
which expand the scope of adversarial examples by enabling the
adversary to generate these starting from an arbitrary point in
the image space compared to prior attacks which are restricted to
existing training/test data (In-Distribution). Second, we present the
Lenticular Printing attack, which relies on an optical phenome-
non to deceive the traffic sign recognition system. We extensively
evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed attacks in both virtual
and real-world settings and consider both white-box and black-box
threat models. Our results demonstrate that the proposed attacks are
successful under both settings and threat models. We further show
that Out-of-Distribution attacks can outperform In-Distribution at-
tacks on classifiers defended using the adversarial training defense,
exposing a new attack vector for these defenses.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The rapid technological and scientific advancements in artificial
intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) have led to their de-
ployment in ubiquitous, pervasive systems and applications, such
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(a) Illustration of Out-of-Distribution evasion attacks on a traffic sign recogni-
tion system trained with traffic sign images. Out-of-Distribution attacks enable
the adversary to start from anywhere in the space of images and do not restrict
her to the training/test data.
Fake traffic Sign 
(Lenticular Attack)
θ𝟏 θ𝟐 Self-driving car Self-driving car’s 
camera sees “no 
overtaking” sign
Human driver sees 
“speed limit (60)” sign
Exploit the difference of heights, hence 
viewing angles, of the camera and the driver
(b) Principle behind an attack based on lenticular printing.
Figure 1: New attack vectors
as authentication systems [1, 2], health-care applications [3, 4], and
several vehicular services [5–8]. The ubiquity of ML provides adver-
saries with both opportunities and incentives to develop strategic
approaches to fool learning systems and achieve their malicious
goals [9, 10]. A number of powerful attacks on the test phase of ML
systems used for classification have been developed over the past
few years, including attacks on Support Vector Machines [11, 12]
and deep neural networks [12–17]. These attacks have also been
shown to work in black-box settings [18–23]. These attacks work
by adding carefully-crafted perturbations to benign examples to
generate adversarial examples. In the case of image data, these
perturbations are typically imperceptible to humans.While these at-
tacks are interesting from a theoretical perspective and expose gaps in
our understanding of the working of neural networks, their practical
importance has remained unclear in real-world application domains.
A few recent research studies have attempted to provide realistic
attacks on ML classifiers, which interact with the physical world
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Figure 2: Toxic signs for our traffic sign recognition pipeline
generated using the In-Distribution attack, the Out-of-
Distribution attack (Logo and Custom Sign), and the Lentic-
ular Printing attack. The adversarial examples are classified
as the desired target traffic sign with high confidence under a
variety of physical conditions when printed out. The Lentic-
ular Printing attack samples flip the displayed sign depend-
ing on the viewing angle, simulating the view of the human
driver and the camera in the autonomous car.
[24, 25]. Kurakin et al. [24] print out virtual adversarial examples,
take their pictures, and then pass them through the original classi-
fier. Sharif et al. [25] attack face recognition systems by allowing
subjects to wear glasses with embedded adversarial perturbations
that can deceive the system. However, both these attacks were car-
ried out in controlled laboratory setting where variations in bright-
ness, viewing angles, distances, image re-sizing etc. were not taken
into account, imposing limitations on their effectiveness in real-
world scenarios. Further, they only focus on creating adversarial
examples from training/testing data (e.g., image of different faces
in the face recognition system) to attack the underlying systems.
We refer to these as In-Distribution attacks. Athalye et al. [26]
introduced the Expectation over Transformations (EOT) method
to generate physically robust adversarial examples and concurrent
work by Evtimov et al. [27] used this method to attack traffic sign
recognition systems. A detailed comparison of our work with these
is at the end of the introduction.
In this paper, we focus on physically-realizable attacks against
sign recognition system utilized in autonomous cars, one of the
most important upcoming application of ML [5, 6, 28, 29]. We in-
troduce two novel types of attacks, namely, Out-of-Distribution and
Lenticular Printing attacks that deceive the sign recognition system,
leading to potentially life-threatening consequences. Our novel
attacks shed lights on how domain-specific characteristics of an ap-
plication domain, in particular, autonomous cars, can be exploited by
an attacker to target the underlying ML classifier.
Our key contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. Introducing new attack vectors: We introduce new meth-
ods to create toxic signs that look benign to human observers,
at the same time, deceive the sign recognition mechanism. Toxic
signs cause misclassifications, potentially leading to serious real-
world consequences including road accidents and widespread traffic
confusion. We significantly extend the scope of attacks on real-
world ML systems in two ways (Figure 1). First, we propose Out-
of-Distribution attack, which enables the adversary to start from
an arbitrary point in the image space to generate adversarial ex-
amples, as opposed to prior attacks that are restricted to samples
drawn from the training/testing distribution. The proposed attack
is motivated by the key insight that autonomous cars are moving
through a complex environment consisting of many objects, which
can potentially used by an attacker to create adversarial examples.We
previously provided a high-level description of Out-of-Distribution
attack in an Extended Abstract [30]. In this paper, we provide an
in-depth explanation of this attack and thoroughly examine its ef-
fectiveness in various experimental scenarios. Second, we present
Lenticular Printing attack, which relies on an optical phenome-
non to fool the sign recognition system. Figure 2 demonstrates a
few toxic signs created by the two above-mentioned attacks.
2. Extensive experimental analysis:We evaluate the proposed
attacks in both virtual and real-world settings over various sets of
parameters.We consider both thewhite-box threat model (i.e., the ad-
versary has access to the details of the traffic sign recognition system)
and the black-box one (i.e., such access is not present). We demonstrate
that adversarial examples (created from either arbitrary points in
the image space or traffic signs) can deceive the traffic sign recog-
nition system with high confidence. Further, we show the attacker
can achieve significant attack success rates even in black-box set-
tings. To provide a thorough analysis of the proposed attacks, we
also conduct real-world drive-by tests, where a vehicle-mounted
camera continuously captures image from the surroundings and
offers its data to the sign recognition system (Figure 8). We achieve
attack success rates in excess of 90% in the real-world setting with
both Out-of-Distribution and In-Distribution attacks.
3. Studying the effect ofOut-of-Distribution attacks on state-
of-the-art defenses:We discuss the limitations of adversarial train-
ing based defenses[14] in mitigating the proposed attacks. We show
Out-of-Distribution attacks, in which the initial image does not
come from the underlying training/testing distribution, outper-
form In-Distribution attacks on adversarial training [14] based
defenses in which adversarial examples are created based on the
initial training dataset and are considered in the training phase.
Known ML-based defenses are intrinsically prone to the Lenticu-
lar Printing attack which has been developed with respect to the
physical characteristics of the application domain.
Comparison with Athalye et al. [26] and Evtimov et al. [27]:
Athalye et al. [26] introduced the Expectation over Transfomations
(EOT) method to generate physically robust adversarial examples.
They used the method to generate 3D printed adversarial examples
which remain adversarial under a range of conditions. These sam-
ples are evaluated on classifiers trained on the Imagenet dataset.
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In concurrent work, Evtimov et al. [27] used the EOT method to
generate physically robust adversarial ‘Stop’ and ‘Right Turn’ signs
in a white-box, In-Distribution setting. They manually crop out
the portion of the video frame corresponding to the adversarial
example while we use an automated detection pipeline. We fur-
ther expand the space of adversarial examples in both virtual and
real-world settings by introducing Out-of-Distribution attacks. We
also evaluate the effectiveness of transferability-based black-box
attacks for both In-Distribution and Out-of-Distribution settings, as
well as defenses using adversarial training. We also introduce the
completely new attack vector of Lenticular Printing attacks based
on optical phenomena which exist outside the ambit of adversarial
examples.
Our proof-of-concept attacks shed light on fundamental security
challenges associated with the use of sign recognition techniques
in autonomous cars, paving the way for further investigation of
overlooked security challenges in this domain.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we present relevant background onmachine learning
systems, the traffic sign recognition pipeline and the adversarial
examples and threat models we consider.
2.1 Supervised machine learning systems
Machine learning systems typically have two phases, a training
phase and a test phase [31]. A classifier f (·;θ ) : X → Y is a
function mapping from the domain X to the set of classification
outputs Y. The number of possible classification outputs is then
|Y|. θ is the set of parameters associated with a classifier. ℓf (x,y) is
used to represent the loss function for the classifier f with respect
to inputs x ∈ X and labels y ∈ Y. The classifier is trained by
minimizing the loss function over n samples {(x1,y1), . . . (xn ,yn )}
drawn from a distribution D over the domain X. In the particular
case of traffic sign recognition, D is a distribution over images of
traffic signs.
Since deep neural networks (DNNs) [32] achieve very high classifi-
cation accuracy in a variety of image classification settings [33, 34],
they are being used for the computer vision systems of autonomous
cars [28, 29]. We thus focus on attacks on DNNs in this paper and
define some notation specifically for neural networks. The outputs
of the penultimate layer of a neural network f , representing the
output of the network computed sequentially over all preceding
layers, are known as the logits. We represent the logits as a vector
ϕf (x) ∈ R |Y | . The final layer of a neural network f used for classi-
fication is usually a softmax layer. The loss functions we use are
the standard cross-entropy loss [32] and the logit loss [15].
2.2 Traffic Sign recognition pipeline
Our traffic sign recognition pipeline (Figure 3) consists of two stages:
detection and classification. We utilize a commonly used recogni-
tion pipeline based on the Hough transform [35–37]. The shape-
based detector uses the circle Hough transform [38] to identify the
regions of a video frame or still image that contain a circular traffic
sign. Before using Hough transform, we smooth a video frame with
a Gaussian filter and then extract only the edges with Canny edge
detection [39]. Triangular signs can be detected by a similar method
Figure 3: Sign recognition pipeline for real-world evaluation.
The pipeline consists of an initial detection phase followed
by a multi-scale CNN as a classifier. In the virtual setting, a
video frame is replaced by a still image.
[36]. The detected image patch is cropped and re-sized to the input
size of the classifier before it is passed on to the neural network
classifier trained on a traffic sign dataset. The classifier outputs
confidence scores for all output classes to determine whether the
input is a traffic sign and assign its label. The label with the highest
confidence is chosen as the final output only if its confidence is
above a certain threshold. Images classified with a low confidence
score are discarded as false positives for detection.
2.3 Adversarial examples and threat models
Our focus is on attacks during the test phase, which are typically
known as evasion attacks. These have been demonstrated in the
virtual setting for a number of classifiers [12, 14, 15, 17, 40, 41].
These attacks aim to modify benign examples x ∈ X by adding a
perturbation to them such that the modified examples x˜ are adver-
sarial, i.e. they are misclassified by the ML system in a targeted
class (targeted attack), or any class other than the ground truth
class (untargeted attack). In the case of attacks on the computer
vision systems of autonomous cars,we focus entirely on targeted
attacks since these are more realistic from an attacker’s perspective.
To generate a targeted adversarial sample x˜ starting from a benign
sample x for a classifier f , the following optimization problem [15]
leads to state-of-the-art attack success rates in the virtual setting:
min d(x˜, x) + λℓf (x˜,T ), (1)
s.t. x˜ ∈ H .
We use this attack as a baseline. Here d is an appropriate distance
metric for inputs from the input domain X (usually an Lp norm),
T is the target class and H is the constraint on the input space.
λ controls the trade-off between minimizing the distance to the
adversarial example and minimizing the loss with respect to the
target. In essence, the optimization problem above tries to find the
closest x˜ to x such that the loss of the classifier at x˜ with respect to
the target T is minimized. For a neural network, ℓf (·, ·) is typically
highly non-convex, so heuristic optimizers based on stochastic
gradient descent have to be used to find local minima [15].
For traffic sign recognition systems, the method described above
produces adversarial examples which do not work well under condi-
tions encountered in the real world such as variation in brightness,
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Figure 4: Overview of the Attack pipeline. This diagram provides an overview of the process by which adversarial examples
are generated for both the Out-of-Distribution attack and In-Distribution attacks.
viewing angles, image re-sizing etc.. That is, if the examples gen-
erated using this method were directly used in Step 3 (mount sign
and drive-by test) of Figure 4, they would not perform well. In light
of this, we incorporate these conditions directly into a modified
optimization problem used in Section 3 to generate physically ro-
bust adversarial examples. Similar approaches to this problem have
been taken in Athalye et al. [26] as well as in concurrent work by
Evtimov et al. [27].
2.3.1 Threat models. We consider two commonly used threat
models for the generation of adversarial examples against deep
neural networks: white-box and black-box. The black-box setting
also applies to the Lenticular Printing attack.
White-box: In the white-box setting, we assume that the adversary
has complete access to the target model f including its architecture
and weights. We briefly justify the powerful attacker considered in
the white-box setting. Consider an attacker who wishes to cause an
autonomous car to detect and misclassify a sign in its environment.
It is conceivable that the attacker can purchase or rent a vehicle of
the kind that is to be attacked, and ‘reverse engineer’ the classifier by
querying it on an appropriate dataset to train a surrogate classifier
that closely mimics the target classifier [42]. Further, direct query-
based attacks can be as powerful as white-box attacks [22, 23]. Thus,
the white-box setting is an important one to consider.
Black-box (no query access): In this setting, the adversary does
not have direct access to the target model. We do not even assume
query access as in previous work [21–23]. In this setting then, black-
box attacks rely on the phenomenon of transferability [13, 18–20],
where adversarial examples generated for a model trained locally
by the attacker, remain adversarial for a different, target model.
The Lenticular Printing attack naturally operates in the black-box
setting since it relies on an optical phenomenon and not on the
internal structure of the classifier.
3 ATTACKS: ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
In this section, we present new methods to generate physically
robust adversarial examples. The main aim for these examples is to
be classified consistently as the desired target class under a variety of
real-world conditions such as variations in brightness, viewing angle,
distance and image re-sizing. In particular, we introduce Out-of-
Distribution attacks, which modify arbitrary, innocuous signs such
that they are detected and classified as potentially dangerous traffic
signs in the attacker’s desired class. This attack greatly enlarges the
possible space of adversarial examples since the adversary now has
the ability to start from any point in the space of images to gener-
ate an adversarial example. We also examine the In-Distribution
attack which generates adversarial examples starting from exist-
ing traffic signs. We then describe the pipeline we use to ensure
these generated adversarial examples are classified consistently
even under randomized input transformations which we use to
model real-world conditions that may be encountered.
3.1 Attack overview
We first provide an overview of our attack pipeline from Figure 4
and then describe each of its components in detail in the following
subsections. Our pipeline has three steps:
Step 1. Obtain the original image x and choose target class T that
the adversarial example x˜ should be classified as. In our attacks, x
can either be an in-distribution image of a traffic sign or an out-of-
distribution image of an ad sign, logo, graffiti etc.
Step 2. Generate the digital version of the physically robust adver-
sarial example as follows:
1. Generate maskM for the original image (A mask is needed to
ensure that the adversary’s perturbation budget is not utilized in
adding perturbations to the background.)
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(a) Classification of Logo attack examples. The adversarial examples are classified with high confidence as a real traffic sign, in
spite of being out of the dataset.
(b) Classification of Custom Sign attack examples. The adversarial examples are classified with high confidence as a real traffic
sign, in spite of being custom made signs.
Figure 5: Frequency of the top-3 labels the given images are classified as under 100 different randomized transformations. The
numbers beside each bar on the bar charts provides the average confidence of the top classification outcomes over the 100
randomized transformations.
2. Re-size both the original image and the mask to the input size
of the target classifier1.
3. Run the physically robust adversarial example optimization
problem from Equation 2 to obtain the perturbation δ . The op-
timization problem includes randomized brightness, perspective
(includes rotations and shearing) and size variations while generat-
ing the adversarial example to ensure it remains adversarial under
real-world conditions.
4. Re-size the output perturbation δ and add it to the original
image.
Step 3. Print and test the generated adversarial example x˜ for ro-
bustness in real-world conditions.
3.2 Step 1: Choosing the input
Now, we describe two different attack modes in which an adver-
sary can operate to generate adversarial examples: (1) the Out-of-
Distribution attack, where the adversary is free to generate adver-
sarial examples from any innocuous elements in the environment
such as advertisement signs, drawings, graffiti etc. and (2) the In-
Distribution attack, where the adversary modifies existing traffic
signs to make them adversarial. The second setting is similar to the
one considered in most previous work on generating adversarial
examples [14, 15].
3.2.1 Out-of-Distribution attacks. We propose a novel attack
based on the concept of adversarial examples by exploiting the fact
that any image in the input domain of the classifier can be made
adversarial by adding an imperceptible perturbation generated by
1This is 32 × 32 pixels for the classifiers we use, described in Table 1
an optimization problem such as Equation 2 which also ensures
physical robustness. Since the classifier is only trained on images
of traffic signs, it can only be expected to reliably classify other
traffic signs, which are effectively, in distribution for that classifier.
However, the fact that it provides a classification outcome for any
input image, represents a security risk which we exploit in our
attacks. In particular, we start with an out-of-distribution image
(not a traffic sign) and generate a targeted adversarial example
from it. Here, we demonstrate two possible instantiations of the
Out-of-Distribution attack.
Logo attacks: In this attack, images of commonly found logos
are modified such that they are detected and classified with high
confidence as traffic signs (Figure 5a). Since these logos are om-
nipresent, they allow an adversary to carry out attacks in real-world
settings such as city streets. In this scenario, the attack pipeline
from Section 3.1 is used and the adversarial perturbation is con-
strained to be as small as possible while still being effective under
transformations.
Custom Sign attacks: In this attack, the adversary creates a
custom sign that is adversarial starting from a blank sign (Figure
5b). Any mask corresponding to graffiti, text etc. on blank signs can
lead to the embedding of adversarial traffic signs in inconspicuous,
graffiti-like objects in the environment. This allows the adversary
to create adversarial examples in any setting by using a mask to
create images or text that are appropriate for the surroundings.
In this attack, the original sign is a solid color circular sign and
the norm of the perturbation is not penalized by the optimization
problem but only constrained by the shape of the mask. This allows
the adversary to draw almost any desired shape on a blank sign
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and the optimization will try to fill out the shape with colors that
make the sign classified as the target class.
Under ordinary conditions when no adversarial examples are
present, the false recognition of objects which are not traffic signs
does not affect the traffic sign recognition system since (i) the
confidence scores corresponding to the predicted labels of these
objects are usually low; (ii) these circular objects are not consistently
classified as a certain sign. The predicted label changes randomly
as the background and viewing angle varies across multiple frames
in the video.
Therefore, a traffic sign recognition system, including ours, can
choose to treat any detection with these two properties as an er-
roneous detection by setting the confidence threshold close to 1
and/or ignoring objects that are inconsistently classified. On the
other hand, the generated adversarial examples are classified con-
sistently as target traffic signs with high confidence under varying
physical conditions which we demonstrate experimentally below.
Confirming hypothesis about classifier confidence: To con-
firm our earlier hypotheses with regard to the confidence of classi-
fication for Out-of-Distribution images and their adversarial coun-
terparts, we display some adversarial examples, their classification
and confidence in Figure 5. Experimental details are in Section 6.
We apply randomized transformations to create 100 images for
each of the Logo signs. The "Original" column of Figure 5a shows
that the logo signs are classified as different classes depending
on the transformation and with low confidence on average. As a
comparison, the “Real" column of Figure 5 shows that real traffic
signs are consistently classified as the correct label with probability
very close to 1. The “Adversarial" column demonstrates that the
generated adversarial examples are consistently classified with high
confidence in the desired target class. In a sense, the adversarial logo
signs and the real traffic signs are equivalent from the perspective
of the classifier.
Similarly, the the Custom Sign attack samples are mostly clas-
sified as the target class with high confidence under 100 different
randomized transformations. Note that even though the original
solid color signs shown in the “Original" column of Figure 5b are
classified with high confidence, their classified labels are arbitrary
and not under the control of the adversary. They are highly depen-
dent on the signs’ orientation and brightness and cannot be used
as reliable adversarial examples. For example, a slight change in
the camera angle may yield different labels which is an undesirable
effect from the adversary’s perspective.
Note: Out-of-Distribution attacks can be carried out against any
classifier in any application domain. We choose to focus on traffic
sign recognition systems since they provide a compelling setting
where such attacks are plausible and effective. Another application
domain of interest is the computer vision systems of Augmented
Reality systems. In certain other settings, such as fooling content
moderation systems [22], Out-of-Distribution attacks may be of
limited interest.
3.2.2 In-Distribution attack. In this attack, images of traffic signs
are modified using imperceptible perturbations such that they are
classified as a different traffic sign. This attack is similar to most
attacks carried out in most previous work in both the virtual [12–15,
Figure 6: Transformations used during both training and
evaluation to simulate real-world conditions. The final col-
umn of images displays the type of images that are included
in the sum in Eq. (2).
17] and physical [24–27] settings. We include it here to demonstrate
that our pipeline works in this setting as well.
3.3 Step 2: Robust adversarial example
generation
In this section, we describe our methodology for generating robust,
physically realizable adversarial examples starting from either of
the inputs described in the previous section.
3.3.1 Optimization problem. Our adversarial example genera-
tion method involves heuristically solving a non-convex optimiza-
tion problem using the Adam optimizer [43] to find the optimal
perturbation δ . The problem set-up is adapted from the general
concept of expectation over transformations [26]. An updating gra-
dient is averaged over a batch of randomly transformed versions of
the original image [27, 44]. The robust adversarial example can be
written as a solution to the minimization problem given below for
any input x:
min
δ ∈Rn
c · 1
B
B∑
i=1
[F (τi (x +M · δ))] +max(∥δ ∥p ,L) (2)
where F (x) = max(maxj,T {ϕ(x)j }−ϕ(x)t ,−K) is the logit loss[15]
and ϕ(x)j is the jth logit of the target network. The constant K de-
termines the desired objective value controls the confidence score
of the adversarial example. M is a mask or a matrix of 0s and 1s
with the same width and height as the input image which is multi-
plied element-wise with the perturbation (M · δ) to constrain the
feasible region to the sign area. τi : Rn → Rn is a transformation
function mapping within the image space (n = 32 × 32 × 3). The
transformations τi are chosen to be differentiable so that gradients
can be propagated back to the original image.
The objective value is penalized by a p-norm of the perturba-
tion δ in order to keep the adversarial perturbation imperceptible
by humans, and the constant c is adjusted accordingly to balance
between the loss and penalty terms. We introduce an additional
constant L to explicitly encourage the norm of the perturbation
to be at least L since overly small perturbations can disappear or be
rendered ineffective in the process of printing and video capturing. In
practice for the Custom Sign attack, the same optimization prob-
lem is used by setting c and L to some large numbers so that the
DARTS: Deceiving Autonomous Cars with Toxic Signs , ,
optimization will focus on minimizing the loss function without
penalizing the norm of the perturbation.
Summary: The optimization problem tries to minimize the average
of the objective function with respect to a perturbation δ restricted
to an area determined by a mask M evaluated on a batch of B
images which are generated from a set of transformation functions
τ1, ...,τB .
3.3.2 Image selection and re-sizing. We use a single RGB image,
re-sized to the input size of the classifier. We use either bilinear
interpolation or nearest neighbours for re-sizing. This input image
is then transformed by the set of differentiable and predefined
transformations with randomized parameters. The attacker has
a low cost with regards to constructing an adversarial example
since only a single image is needed to construct robust adversarial
examples. In the case of In-Distribution attacks, the adversary only
needs one image of the same class as the original sign which can
be easily found on the internet. The image also does not need to be
a real photograph; as we show in our Out-of-Distribution attacks,
any logo or schematic drawing can be used as well.
3.3.3 Mask generation. A mask is a mapping from each pixel of
the image to 0 or 1. Background pixels are mapped to 0 while pixels
from the sign area are mapped to 1. To create a mask, we employ a
simple image segmentation algorithm 2 using Canny edge detection
[46] to outline the boundary of the sign and binary dilation to fill
in the hole. This algorithm works well on an image of a sign of any
shape, given that it is of a high resolution.
3.3.4 Transformations. Here, we describe the set of image trans-
formations used in the optimization which are chosen to virtually
generate a batch of input images resembling the varying real-world
conditions under which the generated physical adversarial example
is expected to be effective. We included three different differentiable
transformations in our experiments: (1) perspective transform, (2)
brightness adjustment and (3) re-sizing, each of which is random-
ized for a particular image while generating an adversarial example
as well as while evaluating it (see metrics used in Section 5.2.1).
Examples of transformations used for both the optimization and
evaluation phases are shown in Figure 6.
Perspective transformation: Orientations of a sign that ap-
pears on an image vary between camera angles, distances and
relative heights. These orientations can be captured by perspective
transformation, an image transformation that maps each of the
four corners of a 2D image to a different point in the 2D space. Any
perspective transformation can be characterized by eight degrees
of freedom which can be represented by a 3× 3 projective transform
matrix with the last entry being set to 1. Other common image
transformations such as rotation, shearing or scaling are subsets of
the perspective transformation.
Brightness adjustment: Naturally, cars drive any time of the
day so an adversary might need the fake sign to be able to fool the
system under different lighting conditions. The simplest way to
simulate settings with different amounts of light or brightness is
to add a constant value to every pixel and every channel (R, G, B)
of an image and then clip the value to stay in the allowed range of
2Code adapted from [45]
Image A Image B Interlaced image
Lenticular
Lens Viewer B sees 
Image B from 
his angle
Viewer A sees 
Image A from 
his angleA
B
(a) Illustration of the process of generating a lenticular image and its angle-
dependent appearance.
O
h
p
(b) Several parameters (p , r , and h) determine the
full angle of observation (O )
Figure 7: Concepts underlying the working of the Lenticular
Printing attack.
[0, 1]. This transformation consisting of an addition and clipping is
differentiable almost everywhere.
Image re-sizing: Due to varying distances between a camera
and a sign, an image of the sign detected and cropped out of the
video frame could have different sizes (equivalent to number of
pixels). Further, after generation, adversarial perturbations are up-
sampled to match the original image size. Subsequently, when the
adversarial sign is detected on the camera, it is cropped out and
down-sampled back to 32 × 32 pixels for the classifier. This re-
sampling process could blur or introduce artifacts to the image,
diminishing the intended effect of adversarial perturbations. We use
a nearest neighbours re-sizing technique for the mask and bilinear
interpolation for all other images.
The randomized transformation τ used during both the genera-
tion and evaluation of adversarial examples is a composition of the
three transformations mentioned above. The degree of randomness
of each transformation is controlled by a set of tunable parameters
to keep them in a range that provides realistic simulations.
Parameter choices: Our optimization program introduces a num-
ber of parameters (c,K ,L,T ,θ , step size, choices of norm) that can
be fine-tuned to control the trade-off between robustness of adver-
sarial examples and their visibility to humans. A detailed analysis of
the procedure we followed to optimize these parameters in tandem
to achieve high attack success rates in practice is in Appendix E.
4 ATTACKS: LENTICULAR PRINTING
In this section, we describe a novel attack on traffic sign recognition
systems that we call the Lenticular Printing attack.
Key idea: Lenticular Printing attack is motivated by the key
insight that the human driver and the vehicle-mounted camera observe
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Component Name Description Usage
Datasets
GTSRB [47] 51,839 32 × 32 RGB images of 43 types of traffic signs (39,209 for training, 12,630for testing) (Figure 10) Training set is augmented to 86,000 samples (see Appendix A). Training and validating both classifiers
GTSDB [48] 900 1360 × 800 RGB images of traffic signs in real-world conditions Evaluating detector+classifier pipeline
Auxiliary traffic data 22 high-resolution RGB images of traffic signs (Figure 11) Generating real-world examples for the In-Distribution attack
Logo 7 high-resolution RGB images of popular logos (Figure 12) Generating real-world examples for the Out-of-Distribution attack
Custom Sign 3 blank circular signs (orange, white and blue)combined with 6 custom masks to constrain perturbations (Figure 13) Generating real-world examples for the Out-of-Distribution attack
Classifiers Multi-scale CNN [49]
Multi-scale CNN with 3 convolutional layers and 2 fully connected layers
98.50% accuracy on GTSRB, 77.1% mAP on GTSDB, 100% accuracy on auxiliary traffic data Main target network (virutal and real-world)
Standard CNN Conventional CNN with 4 convolutional layers and 3 fully connected layers98.66% accuracy on GTSRB, 81.5% mAP on GTSDB, 100% accuracy on auxiliary traffic data Evaluating transferability-based black-box attacks
Table 1: Summary of classifiers and datasets used for experimental evaluation.
the environment from two different observation angles (Figure 1). To
deceive the sign recognition system utilized in autonomous cars,
we create special traffic signs that appear differently from different
observation angles (Figure 2). In particular, we exploit a multi-
step process, known as lenticular printing, that involves creating a
special image from at least two existing images, and combining it
with an array of magnifying lenses (Figure 7a). Lenticular printing
relies on an optical phenomenon and has been traditionally used in
photography and visual arts to generate 2-D images that can offer
an illusion of depth and be changed as the image is viewed from
different angles.
Choosing an appropriate lens array: Here, we briefly de-
scribe how an attacker can use this technique to create malicious
traffic signs. To maximize the possibility of observing two differ-
ent images from two different angles, the attacker should interlace
images so that the width of each row of an image (red and green
rows in Figure 7a) is equal to half of the width of each lens in the
lens array, i.e.,Widthrows = p/2 , where p is shown in 7b. For
a successful attack, the attacker must ensure that the difference
between the observation angle of the driver and the observation
angle of the camera always remains between O/4 and O/2 (i.e.,
O/4 ≤ |θ1 − θ2 | ≤ O/2), where θ1 − θ2 are shown in Figure 1b and
O is the full angle of observation of a lenticular lens (Figure 7b) and
can be determined as follows:
O = 2(sin−1( p2r ) − sin
−1(n ∗ sin(sin
−1( p2r ) − tan−1(ph ))
na
)), (3)
where na is 1.003 (the index of refraction of air), n is the index of
refraction of the lens and all other parameters are shown in Figure
7b. In our experiments, we use commonly-available lens with a
49 ∼ 50-degree full angle of observation (i.e., O ≈ 50 ⇒ 12.5 <
|θ1 − θ2 | < 25 should be maintained during driving).
Creatingmalicious signs: Industrial quality lenticular printing
involves specialized machinery and trained personnel to operate
it. Nevertheless, a simple lenticular image can also be produced
without the need for specialized equipment by using either an
inkjet or a laser color printer and a lenticular lens. We have created
lenticular images using a two-step procedure: (i) we obtain two
images of the same dimensions, one of which is a standard traffic
sign (the adversary’s desired target) and the other one can be a logo,
a custom sign, or another traffic sign. These just have to be of the
same dimensions so that they can be interlaced with the desired
traffic sign; (ii) we print the interlaced image on photo-quality paper
and stick it on the back of a commercially available lenticular lens.
We have used a free software called “SuperFlip” available online to
interlace the chosen images [50].
5 EXPERIMENTAL GOALS AND SETUP
In this section, we describe our experimental goals and setup, which
motivate the results in the subsequent sections.
5.1 Experimental goals
It is well-known that In-Distribution adversarial examples are ex-
tremely effective in the virtual setting. With our experiments, we
show that Out-of-Distribution attacks are effective in both virtual
and real-world settings. In particular, we seek to demonstrate with
an appropriate pipeline for the generation, evaluation and selection
of adversarial examples, an adversary can achieve high real-world
attack success rates. In particular, we answer the following ques-
tions in our experiments:
(1) How effective are Out-of-Distribution attacks starting from
high-resolution real-world images on standard classifiers?
Answer: Section 6
(2) How does an adversary generate and evaluate adversarial
examples for a real-world setting? Answer: Section 6.3
(3) Can Out-of-Distribution attacks break existing state-of-the-
art defenses for neural networks? Answer: Section 6.4
(4) Are transferability-based black-box attacks effective in real-
world settings? Answer: Section 7
(5) Can the Lenticular Printing attack fool classifiers? Answer:
Section 7.1
Overall, we demonstrate that with our pipeline, it is a low over-
head procedure for an adversary to test both In-Distribution and
Out-of-Distribution adversarial examples and subsequently use
these to carry out effective real-world attacks.
5.2 Experimental setup
For our experiments we used a GPU cluster of 8 NVIDIA Tesla
P100 GPUs with 16GB of memory each, running with no GPU
parallelization. A summary of the datasets and classifiers used is
given in Table 1. The overall pipeline was described earlier in Figure
3. Dataset details are in Appendix A, detector details in Appendix
B and classifier details in Appendix C.
5.2.1 Metrics. Our experiments only consider targeted attacks.
Virtual attack success (VAS): This is the standard evaluation
metric used in previous work [15, 20, 22] where the success rate is
measured as the fraction of adversarial examples that are classified
as their target.
Simulated physical attack success (SPAS): Manually printing
out and evaluating the effectiveness of adversarial examples in a
real-world setting is prohibitively expensive. In light of this, we
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Attacks Virtual attack success (VAS) Simulated physical attack success (SPAS) Avg. norm (L1) Avg. confidence
In-Distribution (auxiliary traffic data) 54.34 % 36.65 % 37.71 0.9721
Out-of-Distribution (Logo) 85.71% 65.07% 34.89 0.9753
Out-of-Distribution (Custom Sign) 29.44% 18.72% N.A. 0.9508
Table 2: White-box attack success rates for In-Distribution and Out-of-Distribution attacks on the Multi-scale CNN (virtual
setting).
propose a method to evaluate how physically robust adversarial
examples are likely to be by simulating varying conditions in which
the images of them might be taken. The physical conditions are
virtually simulated by a combination of the randomized image
transformations described earlier (Section 3.3.4). 10 randomized,
composite transformations (brightness, perspective and re-sizing) are
applied to each adversarial and original sample, and the transformed
images are directly fed into the target classifier to determine the
predicted labels. The simulated physical attack success (SPAS) is
then the fraction of these transformed images that are classified in
the adversary’s desired target class divided by the total number of
transformed images.
Perceptibility and confidence: The perceptibility of the pertur-
bations is measured by computing the average L1 norm of the per-
turbation for all adversarial examples. We compute and report the
average confidence of the target class over all successful adversarial
examples.
Efficiency: The slowest step in the generation of each adversarial
example is running the optimization from Eq. (2). Each example
takes about 60s to generate on the hardware we use. We stop the
optimization run after 3000 steps for each sample since the change
in loss between subsequent runs is vanishingly small.
Remark (virtual and physical settings): All results reported in
the virtual setting involve benign and adversarial examples that
remain in a digital format throughout. The results for simulated
physical attacks (SPA) also pertain to images of this nature. The eval-
uation setup and metrics used for real-world attacks are described
in Section 6.3.
6 WHITE-BOX ATTACKS
In this section we present results for both virtual and real-world
attacks, in the white-box setting for adversarial examples. We also
evaluate the effectiveness of our attacks against classifiers trained
using adversarial training and its variants [14, 51].
Attack pipeline in practice: Equation 2 has a number of pa-
rameters such as batch-size B, K to adjust the confidence of the
generated adversarial examples, c to control the trade-off between
distance and loss etc. We tuned these parameters as described in Ap-
pendix E to achieve high SPAS rates. Our attack pipeline, described
in Figure 4 up-samples the generated perturbations to match the
dimensions of the original image. When testing, we again down-
sample these images so that they can be classified.
6.1 Virtual Out-of-Distribution attacks
We first evaluate the effectiveness of the Out-of-Distribution attack
on high-resolution images. This allows us to pick the adversarial
examples that work well in this setting for the real-world experi-
ments. We experiment with 2 types of Out-of-Distribution images:
Logo and Custom Sign.
6.1.1 Logo attack. In this attack, we modify high-resolution
images of innocuous signs and logos such that they are classified
in the desired target class. Each of the 7 original logos is passed
through our attack pipeline to create 20 different Logo adversarial
examples, each meant to be classified as a different, randomly cho-
sen target traffic signs, giving a total of 140 adversarial examples.
This attack achieves an impressive VAS of 85.71% and SPAS of
65.07% with an average confidence of 0.975 as reported in Table 2.
While the adversarial perturbation on the logos significantly affects
the classification results, it is generally not very visible to humans
and usually blends in with the detail of the logos. Some successful
Logo attacks are displayed in Figures 5a and 14b (Appendix).
6.1.2 Custom Sign attack. 3 circular blank signs of the colors
blue, orange, and white are drawn on the computer and used as
the original images for the Custom Sign attacks. Each blank sign is
matched with six different masks (a cricle, a heart, a star, a cross,
the phrase "Hello, World!" and a combination of these shapes).
Each of the total 18 pairs of a blank sign and a mask is used to
generate 10 Custom Sign attacks which would be classified as 10
randomly chosen target traffic signs. In total, 180 Custom Sign
attacks are created for the virtual evaluation. Some Custom Sign
attacks are shown in Figures 5b and 14c (Appendix). The attack
produces adversarial signs that contain the shape of the mask filled
with various colors. In Figure 5b, we pick some of the signs whose
mask is filled well so the text or the shape is clearly visible. Some
of the attacks do not fill up the entire mask resulting in incomplete
shapes. This attack is considerably different from the Logo and the
In-Distribution attacks as the optimization constraint is moved from
the norm of the perturbation to its location instead. The adversary
is allowed to add arbitrary perturbations as long as they are within
the mask, hence the average L1 norm is not applicable. This new
constraint seems to be more strict than the previous one, causing
the attack success rate to drop as shown in Table 2.
Main takeaway: Both the Out-of-Distribution Logo and Custom
Sign attacks are feasible in the virtual white-box setting with high-
confidence classification for the successful adversarial examples.
Their non-trivial SPAS enables the adversary to pick effective ad-
versarial examples from this setting for real-world attacks.
6.2 Virtual In-Distribution attacks
We use high-resolution images from the auxiliary traffic data to
generate In-Distribution attacks for the physical setting since the
GTSRB test images are too low-resolution for large-scale printing.
Both classifiers achieve 100% classification accuracy on these images
in the benign setting. Similar to the Logo attack experiment, each
of the 22 images in the auxiliary traffic data is used to generate
20 In-Distribution attacks for 20 randomly chosen target traffic
signs. Therefore, one experiment contains 440 attacks in total. From
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Attacks White-box (Avg.confidence)
Black-box (Avg.
confidence)
In-Distribution (auxiliary
traffic data) 92.82% (0.9632) 96.68% (0.9256)
Out-of-Distribution (Logo) 52.50% (0.9524) 32.73% (0.9172)
Out-of-Distribution (Cus-
tom Sign) 96.51% (0.9476) 97.71% (0.9161)
Table 3: Real-world attack success rates against the Multi-
scale CNN in the white-box setting (average of 2 signs for
each attack) and on Standard CNN in the black-box setting
(best performing sign samples transferred fromMulti-scale
CNN).
Table 2, we can see that attacks using these samples are feasible,
confirming previous work.
6.3 Real-world attacks (Out-of-Distribution
and In-Distribution)
To carry out a real-world attack, we first chose 2 adversarial ex-
amples from each of the Logo, Custom Sign and Auxiliary traffic
sign datasets that performed well under the Simulated Physical
Attack (i.e. had consistent high confidence classification). Each of
these examples was re-sized to 30×30 inches and printed on a high-
quality poster. The printed signs are stuck on a pole at a height of
2 meters from the ground on the left side of the road with respect
to a car driving towards the pole. A GoPro HERO5 was mounted
behind the car’s windshield to take videos of 2704 × 1520 pixels at
30 frames per second. Starting around 25 meters from the sign, the
car approached it with an approximate speed of 16kph. The traffic
sign recognition pipeline only detects and classifies once every 5
frames to reduce the processing time and redundancy.
Real-world attackmetric: To evaluate real-world attacks, we use
a different metric since the number of adversarial examples used is
smaller. In this section, the attack success rate reported is computed
by counting the number of frames in which a sign was detected
in the input frame and classified as the target class and dividing
this number by the total number of frames in which there was a
detection. In other words, we can express this as:
Drive-by attack success = No. of frames sign is misclassifiedNo. of frames sign is detected
(4)
Real-world attack success: To demonstrate the effectiveness of
our adversarial examples in the real world, we carried out drive-by
tests (shown in Figure 8) on 2 samples from each of our attacks (In-
Distribution, Logo, and Custom Sign). Each of the drive-by attack
success rates reported in Table 3 is an average of three runs. We
hypothesize that the lower attack success rate for the Logo attack
in the drive-by setting occurs because the particular instance that
was chosen had a more difficult target class. However, for frames
classified as the target, the confidence is high. The source-target
pairing for the In-Distribution attack was two speed limit signs,
which could have contributed to the high attack success.
Main takeaway. In the drive-by tests, both the Out-of-Distribution
and In-Distribution adversarial examples can achieve attack success
rates in excess of 90%.
Attacks VAS SPAS Avg. confi-dence
Avg. norm
(L1)
In-Distribution (auxiliary
traffic data) 2.53% 2.47% 0.9358 38.92
Out-of-Distribution (Logo) 11.42% 7.42% 0.8054 36.12
Out-of-Distribution (Cus-
tom Sign) 6.67% 5.77% 0.9957 N.A.
Table 4: Attack success rates and deterioration rate on ad-
versarially trainedMulti-scale CNN for Out-of-Distribution
and In-Distribution attacks in the virtual white-box setting.
6.4 Attacking defended models
In this sectionwe examine the effectiveness of theOut-of-Distribution
and In-Distribution attacks against state-of-the-art defenses based
on the concept of adversarial training [14]. In this paper, we are
the first to analyze the effectiveness of adversarial training against
physically robust adversarial examples. We note that this defense
mechanism is completely ineffective against lenticular printing
based attacks.
6.4.1 Adversarial training. This defense modifies the loss func-
tion of neural networks to increase their robustness against adver-
sarial examples. The training loss is modified as follows:
ℓadvf (x,y) = αℓf (x,y) + (1 − α)ℓf (x˜,y), (5)
where α ∈ [0, 1] controls the adversarial component of the loss
and x˜ is an adversarial example. We trained Multi-scale CNN using
the loss function above with α = 0.5 and using Fast Gradient Sign
adversarial examples [14] with an ϵ = 0.3. The model was trained
for 15 epochs and has an accuracy of 96.37% on the GTSRB valida-
tion set. We do not use the adversarial examples generated using
Equation (2) as each sample takes prohibitively long to generate
for the purposes of training. Further details are in Appendix G.
6.4.2 Effect of Out-of-Distribution attacks on adversarially trained
models. The virtual white-box attack results given in Table 4 demon-
strate that adversarial training is very effective as a defense against
In-Distribution attacks since the VAS using auxiliary traffic data
drops to 54.34% to 2.53% while the SPAS drops from 36.65% to 2.47%.
On the other hand, the VAS and SPAS for the Out-of-Distribution
Logo attack remain at 11.42% and 7.42% respectively. Thus, the
Logo attack is about 3 − 4× more effective than the In-Distribution
attack. The Custom Sign attack is also more effective that the In-
Distribution attack, indicating that Out-of-Distribution attacks are
more effective against these defenses.
Main takeaway: Adversarial training cannot defend against
Lenticular Printing and Out-of-Distribution attacks are more effec-
tive than previously examined In-Distribution attacks. Thus, we
have introduced new attack vectors against these state-of-the-art
defenses.
7 BLACK-BOX ATTACKS ARE POSSIBLE
In the black-box attack setting, we use adversarial examples gener-
ated for the Multi-scale CNN and test their attack success rate on
Standard CNN in both virtual and real-world settings. The recogni-
tion pipeline is kept the same, but the classifier is changed. The rea-
son this attack is expected to work is the well-known phenomenon
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Figure 8: Classification outcomes for adversarial examples in the drive-by test. All combinations of distances and attacks lead
to the desired classification outcome with high confidence. Even frames captured at around 25 metres from the sign lead to
high confidence targeted misclassification.
Attacks Black-box VAS Black-box SPAS Avg. confidence
In-Distribution (auxiliary
traffic data) 7.14% 6.08% 0.9273
Out-of-Distribution (Logo) 14.28% 12.57% 0.8717
Out-of-Distribution (Cus-
tom Sign) 3.33% 6.00% 0.7193
Table 5: Black-box attack success rates for In-Distribution
and Out-of-Distribution attacks. Adversarial examples gen-
erated for Multi-scale CNN are tested on Standard CNN.
of transferability [18–20], where adversarial examples generated for
one classifier remain adversarial for another. Since both classifiers
are trained on the same dataset, we are implicitly assuming that
the adversary has access to the training data. This is a common
assumption in previous work on transferability-based black-box
attacks.
Virtual attacks: Table 5 shows adversarial success rate in a black-
box setting, demonstrating the transferability of adversarial exam-
ples. While there is a significant drop in attack success rates, both
the VAS and SPAS for the Out-of-Distribution Logo attacks remain
at non-negligible rates of above 10% indicating that even an attacker
with very limited knowledge of the target classifier can carry out
successful attacks.
Real-world attacks:We use the black-box attack pipeline to eval-
uate the same videos captured in the drive-by tests (Table 3). With
the same set of signs that perform best in the white-box case, the
Out-of-Distribution Custom Sign and the In-Distribution attacks
both achieve very attack high success rates of 97.71% and 96.68%
respectively, comparable to the white-box setting. One of the Logo
attacks achieves an attack success rate of 32.73% in the black-box
case. Note that the higher attack success rates for the black-box
setting arise from the fact that we just report numbers for the best-
performing adversarial sign and not an average over two signs.
Main takeaway: Black-box attack success rates in excess of 90%
can be achieved in real-world settings with appropriately chosen
adversarial examples. This represents a significant threat against
traffic sign recognition systems since no system knowledge is re-
quired for these.
7.1 Lenticular printing attacks
In these experiments, we aim to show that the difference in viewing
angle between the camera on an AV and the human controller
or passenger can lead to an attack, since the human will see an
appropriate sign, while the camera will see the targeted sign, which
could be dangerous in that environment. To simulate what the
human/camera will see, we take pictures from different heights
showing the sign changing. We emphasize that the adversarial
nature of these examples stems purely from the viewing angle, and
the human and the camera would recognize the sign as the same if
they viewed it from the same angle.
In our experiments with the Lenticular Printing attack, we stuck
three different signs on an indoor surface (Figure 9). These signs flip
between ‘Speed limit 60’ and ‘No Passing’, ’Turn left’ and ’Speed
limit 60’, and ’Turn left’ and ’Turn right’ respectively. We take pic-
tures of these signs from three different observation angles (θ1 = 8,
θ2 = 25, and θ3 = 33 degrees) using a standardmobile phone camera
at a distance of 1.9metres from the signs. The camera is held parallel
to the plane of the cupboard. In all cases, when passed through our
traffic sign recognition pipeline, each sign classified was classified
as the appropriate one for that viewing angle with high confidence.
Validating theory: Based on the theoretical discussion in Section
4, we expect that the camera observes two images from two differ-
ent angles if the difference between these two observation angles
is between 12.5 and 25 degrees. This matches our observations
demonstrated in Figure 9: (1) 25 ≥ |θ1 − θ2 | = 17 ≥ 12.5 and
25 ≥ |θ1 − θ3 | = 25 ≥ 12.5, indicating that the first image should
look different from other images, and (2) |θ2 − θ3 | = 8 ≤ 12.5,
suggesting that the second and third images should look similar.
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(a) Camera height
of 1.5metres. Signs
classified as ‘Speed
limit 60’, ‘Turn left’
and ‘Turn right’ re-
spectively, with a
confidence of 1.0.
(b) Camera height
of 0.8metres. Signs
classified as ‘No
passing’, ‘Speed
limit 60’ and ‘Turn
left’ respectively,
with a confidence
of 1.0.
(c) Camera height
of 0.5metres. Signs
classified as ‘No
passing’, ‘Speed
limit 60’ and ‘Turn
left’ respectively,
with a confidence
of 1.0.
Figure 9: Proof-of-concept implementation of the Lenticular
Printing attack. These images show that if the camera used
for the traffic sign recognitionmodule of an AV is at a differ-
ent height from the human controller, then the Lenticular
Printing attack can fool the classifier, while appearing to be
correct to the human.
How can the attacker ensure that the driver cannot see
different images as the car approaches the sign? The attacker
can readily measure the range of the observation angle of the driver
and the camera given the height of the driver’s eyes, the height of
the camera, and height of the sign. The attacker can then create
and install the sign, while considering the theoretical discussion in
Section 4. A straightforward estimation of the height of the driver’s
eyes and the height of the camera can be made based on the height
of the target vehicle. For simplicity, the attacker can install the sign
on a flat road at the height of the driver’s eyes. In this case the
observation angle of the driver remains fixed, in particular, θ1 = 0.
8 LIMITATIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this section, we discuss some limitations of our approaches for
both attacks and defenses and outline possibilities for future work
to overcome these limitations.
Adversarial example detectors as a countermeasure: While
detection based defenses such as Feature Squeezing [52] and Mag-
Net [53] are ineffective against In-Distribution white-box attacks
[54], it is an open question as to how they will perform against
Out-of-Distribution attacks. We plan to explore detection-based
defenses such as these in future work.
Fooling synthesis of sensor inputs: The computer vision sub-
system of an AV, while critical, is not the only actor in the decision
making process when confronted with a new situation. A number
of other sensors such as LIDAR, GPS, radar etc. also provide inputs
which are then synthesized to come up with a decision [55]. While
the computer vision subsystem is the only one able to recognize a
traffic sign, the other sensors may be able to indicate that the sign
recognized is incompatible with their inputs. This consideration
is out of the scope of the current work, but we plan to explore
simultaneous attacks on these varied subsystems in future work.
Choice of norm: In this paper, we chose the L1 norm to measure
the visibility of adversarial perturbations as done in several previ-
ous works on virtual attacks [15, 56, 57]. However, it is still an open
research question if this is the best choice of distance function to
constrain adversarial perturbations. Previous work on generating
adversarial examples has explored the appropriateness of other
commonly used Euclidean norms such as L∞ [14] and L2 [15, 19] as
well. Especially in the context of future work on generating physi-
cally realizable adversarial examples, we encourage further work
on conducting user studies to determine the most appropriate proxy
for measuring human perceptibility of adversarial perturbations.
9 RELATEDWORK
Virtual white-box attacks: Evasion attacks (test phase) have been
proposed for Support Vector Machines [11, 12], random forests [58]
and neural networks [12–17]. Nguyen et al. [59] generate adversar-
ial examples starting from random noise restricted to the virtual
white-box setting. Poisoning attacks (training phase) have also
been proposed for a variety of classifiers and generative models
[60–64]. Attacks have also been proposed on policies for reinforce-
ment learning [65], models with structured prediction outputs [66],
semantic segmentation models [67, 68] and neural network based
detectors [69].
Virtual black-box attacks: The phenomenon of transferability
[13, 19] has been used to carry out black-box attacks on real-world
models [18, 20]. Powerful query-based black-box attacks have also
been demonstrated [21–23, 70–72].
Real-world attacks: Kurakin et al. [24] were the first to explore
real-world adversarial examples. They printed out adversarial ex-
amples generated using the Fast Gradient Sign attack and passed
them through a camera to determine if the resulting image was
still adversarial. This attack was restricted to the white-box setting
and the effect of varying physical conditions was not taken into
account. Sharif et al. [44] investigated how face recognition systems
could be fooled by having a subject wear eyeglasses with adversar-
ial perturbations printed on them. While their attack results were
encouraging, they did not rigorously account for varying physical
conditions and only took multiple pictures of a subject’s face to
increase the robustness of the attack. Further, they only tested their
black-box attacks in a virtual setting with query access to the target
model. Petit et al. [73] examine the susceptibility of the LIDAR
and camera sensors in an autonomous car but their attacks are
unable to cause targeted misclassification. Lu et al. [74] and Chen
et al. [75] attempted physical-world attacks on R-CNN based traffic
sign detectors [76]. However, large perturbations were needed in
both cases. We plan to explore Out-of-Distribution attacks on these
detectors in future work. Comparisons with the related work of
Athlaye et al. [26] and Evtimov et al. [27] have been elucidated in
Section 1.
10 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have demonstrated a wide range of attacks on
traffic sign recognition systems, which have severe consequences
for self-driving cars. Out-of-Distribution attacks allow an adversary
to convert any sign or logo into into a targeted adversarial example.
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The Lenticular Printing attack moves beyond the paradigm of ad-
versarial examples to create images that look different from varying
heights, allowing an adversary to stealthily embed a potentially
dangerous traffic sign into an innocuous one, with no access to
the internals of the classifier. We demonstrated the effectiveness
of our attacks in both virtual and real-world settings. We are the
first to carry out black-box attacks in a real-world setting as well as
to evaluate possible countermeasures against physical realizations
of robust adversarial examples. We hope our discussion of future
research directions encourages further exploration into securing
physically deployed machine learning systems.
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A APPENDIX: DATASET DETAILS
We use the German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB)
[47], a widely-used standard dataset for traffic sign recognition, to
train and test both classifiers 3. It contains 51,839 images of 43 types
of traffic signs in total. Each image is a 32 × 32 RGB image with
the pixels scaled to lie in [0, 1]. Sample images are shown in Figure
10.The 39,209 training samples are augmented to 86,000 (2,000 for
each class) using perspective transformation and flipping signs that
are invariant to flipping (i.e. "no entry") or that are interpreted as a
different class after flipped (i.e. "turn right" to "turn left").
Auxiliary high-resolution dataset: To create fake traffic signs
that look realistic, we used 22 high-resolution traffic sign images
to use as original images for the In-Distribution attack, shown in
Figure 11. They are a mixture of real photographs and computer-
generated drawings on an arbitrary background image.
Logo dataset: To create realistic-looking Out-of-Distribution Logo
adversarial examples, we used 7 high-resolution Logo images on
arbitrary backgrounds as shown in Figure 12.
CustomSigndataset:To create realistic-lookingOut-of-Distribution
Custom Sign adversarial examples, we used 3 circular blank signs
(orange, blue and white) in combination with 6 masks on arbitrary
backgrounds as shown in Figure 13.
B APPENDIX: DETECTOR DETAILS
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we design our de-
tector to only locate circular signs on images using a well-known
shape-based object detection technique in computer vision, Hough
transform [38]. Triangular signs can be detected by a similar method
described in [36]. In detail, our pipeline takes a video frame as an
input and smooths it with a Gaussian filter to remove random noise.
The processed images are passed through a Canny edge detector
and then a circle Hough transform which outputs coordinates of
the center and radii of the circles detected. The outputs are used to
determine a square bounding box around the detected signs. The
section of the input frame inside the bounding boxes are cropped
out of their original unprocessed image and resized to 32× 32 pixels
which is the input size of the neural network classifier.
3We chose GTSRB over the LISA Traffic Sign Dataset [77] as GTSRB offers a much
larger number of samples leading to better generalized classifiers.
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Figure 10: Samples from the GTSRB dataset
Figure 11: The auxiliary traffic data. Some high-resolution images sampled from the auxiliary traffic data. The auxiliary traffic
data is a combination of real traffic sign photos and computer-generated drawings in front of a simple background.
Figure 12: Logo dataset. High-resolution images of common logos.
Figure 13: Custom Sign dataset. Blank signs with 6 different masks.
C APPENDIX: CLASSIFIER DETAILS
Our classifier in thewhite-box setting, referred to asMulti-scale CNN
is based on a multi-scale convolutional neural network (CNN) [49]
with 3 convolutional layers and 2 fully connected layers. There is
also an extra layer that pools and concatenates features from all con-
volutional layers, hence the name multi-scale. The training proce-
dure is adpated from [78]. The model is trained on data-augmented
training set (86,000 samples, 2,000 for each class) generated by ran-
dom perspective transformation and random brightness and color
adjustment. There is no image preprocessing. The training takes
41 epochs with learning rate of 0.001. Dropout and weight regu-
larization (λ = 1e−3) are used to reduce overfitting. The accuracy
of the model, which will be referred to as Multi-scale CNN, on
the validation set is 98.50%. The model is defined in Keras [79]
using Tensorflow [80] backend. The entire recognition pipeline (the
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detector combined with the classifier) is tested with the German
Traffic Sign Detection Benchmark (GTSDB) [48] where it achieves
a reasonable mean average precision (mAP) [81] of 77.10% at the
intersection-over-union (IoU) of 0.5.
Standard CNN (used in the black-box attack setting) is a standard
CNN (not multi-scale) with four convolutional layers and three
dense layers. It is trained on the same dataset as Multi-scale CNN,
and achieves an accuracy of 98.66% on the validation set of GTSRB.
The mean average precision (mAP) of the entire pipeline with
Standard CNN on the GTSDB dataset is 81.54%. In the black-box
setting, the attacks are generated based on Multi-scale CNN which
is assumed to be trained by the adversary as a substitute model for
the true classifier in use, Standard CNN. All experiments in Section
7 use this black-box pipeline to evaluate the attacks. Both classifiers
achieve a 100% accuracy on the auxiliary traffic data, implying that
they have generalized well to images of traffic signs.
D APPENDIX: BASELINE RESULTS
We compare the adversarial examples generated using our method
to those generated by the optimization problem in Eq. (1) (referred
to as Vanilla Optimization) on a random subset of 1000 traffic signs
chosen from the test data of the GTSRB dataset. These results are
not comparable to the ones in the main text using high-resolution
data since both the masking and re-sizing effects are absent from
these.
The result shown in Table 6 demonstrates that our attack has a
much lower deterioration rate (DR) compared to the Vanilla Opti-
mization attacks. The Vanilla Optimization attack with the same
parameters as our attack indicates that forcing perturbation to be
large (having a large norm) can increase its robustness to transfor-
mation to a certain degree. However, our attack can achieve a much
lower deterioration rate with a similar average norm emphasizing
the substantial effect the addition of random transformations to
the optimization problem has on improving the physical robust-
ness of adversarial examples. As expected, both the VAS and SPAS
are lower for the adversarially trained Multi-scale CNN and the
black-box attack setting.
E APPENDIX: PARAMETER TUNING
We use an additional metric, the Deterioration rate (DR) in this
section. This metric measures what fraction of the generated ad-
versarial examples remain adversarial under simulated physical
conditions: DR = 1 − SPASVAS . A higher deterioration rate implies
that the adversarial examples are more likely to degrade under the
transformations, and by extension in a real-world setting.
The set of initial parameters was manually chosen to maximize
the VAS on the auxiliary traffic data on Multi-scale CNN while
maintaining a low average perturbation as measured in the L1
norm. We use the L1 norm since we found it to achieve the best
trade-off between the various performance metrics such as VAS,
SPAS and DR that we considered. Due to this trade-off, we chose
not to use a grid search to fine the optimization parameters. Once
we had a set of parameters that worked well, we changed each
of the parameters individually to understand their effect on the
attack performance metrics. Fist, we set the parameter L to control
the norm of the output perturbation. Depending on the type of
norms used in the objective function, L can be chosen roughly to
any number larger than zero to force the algorithm to explore more
solutions that cause targeted misclassification instead of finding
those that merely minimize the norm. With L chosen for each norm,
we vary the constant c , norm p, the number of transformation T ,
and degree of randomness of the transformations. We use θ1 for
perspective transformation, θ2 for brightness adjustment and θ3
for image resizing. We find that varying θ3 does not significantly
affect the outputs and thus do not discuss it further.
The baseline attack uses L1 norm with the parameters c = 3,K =
100,L = 30,T = 128,θ1 = 0.07,θ2 = 0.15. Table 7 shows results
from 13 experiments each of which vary specified parameters from
the baseline. We use Adam optimizer to solve the optimization
problem with learning rate (step size) of 0.02without decay. It must
be noted that all four result columns of Table 7 must be viewed in
conjunction, instead of only considering one column, because they
represent the trade-offs of the attacks. For example, we can see that
by increasing the degree of randomness (θ1,θ2), attack success rates
generally increase, but the norms also become larger making the
perturbation more noticeable. In particular, setting θ1 = 0.15 results
in the second highest physical success rate and the lowest deteriora-
tion rate, but it also produces perturbation with the second largest
norm. Similarly, setting K to be larger encourages the optimization
to look for more adversarial solutions which also comes with the
cost of a large perturbation. Increasing the number of transforma-
tions makes the attack more successful under transformation while
reducing the success rate in the virtual setting slightly. In fact, using
512 transformations produces both high physical attack success
rate and a small norm for the perturbation with only the expense
of longer computation time. For an adversary who only needs a
few adversarial signs, he or she can afford to use a large number
of transformation or even run a search for optimal parameters for
a specific setting. For the Custom Sign attack, since there is no
constraint on the norm of the perturbation both c and L and are
increased to obtain perturbations that fit within the mask and are
adversarial. Table 7 contains the results from tuning the various
optimization parameters from Equation 2.
Main takeaway. The number of tunable parameters in the op-
timization represents an advantage for the adversary since they
can be tuned to achieve the desired trade-off between the different
performance metrics. We chose a particular set of parameters that
worked well for our evaluation setting, and clarified the changes in
performance that occur when these are tweaked.
F APPENDIX: MORE ADVERSARIAL
EXAMPLES
Here, we include some of the adversarial examples we have gener-
ated for all of the three attacks in Figure 14. The samples shown
also achieve 100% SPAS.
G APPENDIX: ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
Ideally, the x˜ in Eq.(5) (modified loss function) should also be gen-
erated in the same manner as the robust physical attacks. However,
as mentioned earlier, each adversarial example generated using our
method takes around 60s to generate. This makes it impractical to
run the optimization for every training batch.
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Models Attacks Virtual attack success (VAS) Simulated physical attack success (SPAS) Avg. norm (L1) Avg. confidence
Multi-scale CNN Baseline CW [15] attack (GTSRB test data) 97.91% 46.74% 30.45 0.9321In-Distribution (GTSRB test data) 99.07% 95.50% 31.43 0.9432
Multi-scale CNN adv In-Distribution (GTSRB test data) 36.35% 27.52% 31.57 0.9428
Multi-scale CNN→ Standard CNN In-Distribution (GTSRB test data) 47.77% 38.08% 31.43 0.8838
Table 6: White-box attack success rates for baseline and In-Distribution attacks on the GTSRB test data. The parameters for
the Carlini-Wagner attack are modified in order to increase its Simulated Physical Attack Success rate.
Description Parameters VAS SPAS DR Avg. norm (L1)
Chosen params c = 3,K = 100,L = 30,T =128,θ1 = 0.07,θ2 = 0.15
54.34% 36.65% 32.55% 37.71
Perturbation
norm
L2 norm (c = 0.2,L = 2) 27.04% 15.09% 37.23% 76.74
L2 norm (c = 0.02,L = 2) 14.03% 7.76% 44.69% 54.13
L∞ norm (c = 5e−5,L = 0.1) 43.37% 24.41% 43.72% 162.76
Adversarial
confidence
K = 50 48.21% 28.58% 40.71% 32.89
K = 200 59.69% 50.91% 14.71% 50.53
# of transformed
samples
T = 32 54.59% 32.08% 41.23% 35.44
T = 512 46.43% 37.81% 18.57% 35.82
Degree of
transformation
(θ1: perspective
transformation,
θ2: brightness
adjustment)
θ1 = 0,θ2 = 0 31.89% 6.26% 80.37% 31.87
θ1 = 0.03 44.13% 8.88% 79.88% 33.21
θ1 = 0.15 51.79% 44.88% 13.34% 43.70
θ2 = 0 52.55% 34.56% 34.23% 36.61
θ2 = 0.075 52.80% 35.68% 32.42% 36.94
θ2 = 0.30 50.26% 39.34% 21.72% 39.40
Table 7: Variation in attack success rates, deterioration rates and average norm of attack with different sets of optimization
parameters. Rows with numbers in bold represent parameter settings that achieve a good trade-off between the various per-
formance metrics. However, both these rows have a higher average perturbation norm than the chosen set of parameters.
The simplest attack against DNNs is known as the Fast Gradient
Sign (FGS) [14] attack which is an untargeted attack that involves
adding a perturbation proportional to the sign of the gradient of
the loss function of the neural network x˜ = x + ϵsign(∇xℓf (x,y)).
The advantage of this attack is that it is extremely fast to carry out
so it can be incorporated into the training phase of neural networks
to make them more robust to adversarial examples.
Note about norms: While our attack samples have on average
a maximum L1 perturbation of around 30, the L1 ball with that
radius is too large to train with, since the ball has to lie in the unit
hypercube. Since most of the adversarial examples do not modify
each individual pixel by more than 0.3, it is a reasonable upper limit
to use while training. In our experiments, we tried training with
adversarial examples constrained with the L1, L2 and L∞ norms
and found the defense to work best with an L∞ norm constraint.
We also tried using the iterative adversarial training defense
proposed by Madry et al. [51]. However, we faced a number of
issues with this defense. First, it is known that the adversarial loss
with iterative adversarial samples does not converge for classifiers
with low capacity. When we attempted to train the Multi-scale CNN
with iterative adversarial examples and the augmented training data,
we observed the same behavior. Using the standard training data,
the model converged to a validation accuracy of 96.2%. However, its
performance on adversarial examples generated using the auxiliary
traffic data was inferior to that of theMulti-scale CNNwith standard
adversarial training.
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(a) Some samples of our In-Distribution (Adversarial Traffic Sign) attack, along with the labels they are classified as.
(b) Some samples of our Out-of-Distribution (Logo) attack, along with the labels they
are classified as.
(c) Some samples of our Out-of-Distribution (Custom Sign) attack, along with the labels
they are classified as.
Figure 14: Adversarial examples that achieve SPAS of 100%.
